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The Impact of Connecticut’s Clean
Election Law:
an Empirical Quick Look
Abstract:
The State of Connecticut’s General Assembly passed a Clean Elections Law
in 2005. In this paper we conduct a preliminary appraisal of the law’s
performance based on recently published data on the voting results of the
2010 and 2008 state-wide office elections. The Clean Elections Law was
considered among the most stringent in the nation at the time of its
passage. It established full public financing for all elections to state
offices, including the state legislature. The law applied to primaries as
well as general elections. It allowed for supplemental monies in
unbalanced contests pitting a privately-financed candidate against a
publicly-financed one. The law also contained provisions banning
campaign donations from lobbyists and state contractors.
Our study is similar to the 2009 one prepared by the Office of Legislative
Research but with the benefit of additional data drawn from the 2010
election cycle. Importantly, we conduct our examination using statistical
tests with significance thresholds at conventional 95 percent levels. We
also add additional performance metrics to provide a wider lens to the
appraisal. We use resampling methods to draw multiple simulated
samples to calculate statistical significance. Resampling techniques
provide a non-parametric determination of a statistic’s distribution and a
measure of effectiveness that is not sensitive to deviations from the
assumptions underlying most parametric procedures.

Based on the results derived from statistical tests of the assembled
metrics it is difficult to conclude that the public funding of elections in the
State of Connecticut is an unqualified success, or for that matter, a
qualified success. It appear that the one conclusion that we can
unambiguously draw is that the effusiveness and optimism of the various
commentators supporting clean election laws has not yet come to be
realized in the State of Connecticut.

A.E. Rodriguez1
University of New Haven
&
Lesley DeNardis
Sacred Heart University
November 2011
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Introduction
It is morally as bad not to care whether a thing is true or not, so
long as it makes you feel good, as it is not to care how you got
your money, as long as you have got it.
Edwin Way Teal (Circle of the Seasons, 1953)

Clean election laws aim to fund races for state assemblies with
public monies, simultaneously proscribing any number of practices
including limiting or altogether eliminating private funds expended
in support of any candidate (General Accounting Office 2003,
Zagaja 2009).

Clean elections laws, in the view of advocates,

constitute a remedy for a variety of social ills including government
corruption, excessive interest-group influence, wasteful and
excessive campaign spending, minimal electoral competition and
lethargic individual voter participation (Mayer, Werner and
Williams 2005).
In 2005, the State of Connecticut’s General Assembly passed a
Clean Elections’ Law, possibly the most stringent in the nation at
the time (Nyhart 2006). The Citizens Election Program established
full public financing for all elections to state offices, including the
state legislature (Mayer and Werner 2007, Zagaja 2009). The law
applied to primaries as well as general elections. It allowed for
supplemental monies in unbalanced contests pitting a privatelyfinanced candidate against a publicly-financed one. The law also
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contains provisions banning campaign donations from lobbyists and
state contractors.
There are only three formal appraisal of Connecticut Citizens’
Elections Program (to our knowledge): an analysis by Sullivan, of
the Office of Legislative Research (Sullivan 2009) and a study by
Zagaja (Zagaja 2009). In addition, Parnell conducts an interesting
albeit limited study examining whether the election law has altered
voting patterns of legislators (Parnell 2010).
Sullivan examined the effect of the legislation on (i) voter choice,
(ii) electoral competition, (iii) voter participation and (iii) program
participation data by examining changes between the 2006 and the
2008 election cycle. Although not testing for statistical significance
the findings of the Sullivan’s Office of Legislative Research study
were charitably inconclusive at best, noting that: “it is too early to
draw any causal linkages to changes, if any, that resulted from the
public financing programs (Sullivan 2009)”.
Zagaja examines quantitative and qualitative changes in several
metrics between 2004 and 2008: (i) electoral landscape, (ii)
participations, (iii) electoral competition, (iv) diversity, (v)
decreasing the actual or appearance of influence by interest groups
and candidates, limited excessive campaign spending, allowing
candidates to spend less time fundraising, and, (vi) increasing voter
confidence and participation. Zagaja’s results are decidedly mixed.
Although Zagaja does not rely on statistical testing in arriving at
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conclusions his results are instructive nevertheless perhaps because
of the added perspective provided by the various qualitative
measures attempted. Zagaja’s findings suggest that the electoral
law’s goals were met in only two of the seven metrics he examines:
(i) participation, and, (vi) allowing candidates to spend less time
fundraising. As for the remaining six measures, they were either
inconclusive or conferred no support for the electoral law claim.
Specifically: scrutiny of (ii) electoral competition, (iii) diversity, (iv)
decreasing the actual or appearance of influence by interest groups
on candidates, and, (v) limiting excessive campaign spending,
proffered no support for the electoral law thesis.
Parnell takes aim at the special interest rationale of the Connecticut
election law (Parnell 2010).

He measures changes in the voting

patterns of legislators who served in the Connecticut General
Assembly during the 2007-08 session and accepted taxpayer dollars
for their 2008 reelection campaign. Specifically, he argues that by
identifying significant interest groups and comparing their legislative
priorities to voting patterns, a finding of a noticeable change in voting
since the beginning of election law constitutes support for the
argument that freeing legislators from private, voluntary contributions
has indeed made legislators more responsive to citizens and less
responsive to so-called special interests (Parnell 2010). Parnell’s more
limited and more focused study finds “no evidence to support the

contention that providing taxpayer dollars to legislative candidates
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reduces the likelihood that a legislator will vote with an interest
group”
In this paper we conduct an appraisal similar to the Office of
Legislative Research (Sullivan) study but with the benefit of
additional data drawn from the 2010 election cycle. Importantly,
we conduct our examination using statistical tests with significance
thresholds at conventional 95 percent levels. We also add other
performance metrics to provide a wider lens to the appraisal.
There as two important qualifications regarding our results. First,
there are neither theoretical nor standard metrics that can be
invoked ex ante in the examination of legislation such as the
election law of Connecticut.

Although one can conceivably

assemble a significantly large number of informative metrics
appraising the impact of election laws generally, several authors
consistently examine the same few variables. We examine the
Sullivan metrics and a few others popular with researchers.
However, and for purposes of establishing criteria for success - few
of these metrics are outcome metrics; all are instrumental ones.
Thus, success is in terms of the particular realization of the
instrumental metric and not necessarily in terms of ultimate
outcomes – however defined.
For instance, consider the metric ‘voter participation.’ If the
number of voters increases after the adoption of the election law,
all else equal, one could attribute the increase to the law and
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thereby argue that the law has been shown to be a success.
However, no such conclusion can be established if the ultimate
outcome of interest is the economic fortunes of the state – gauged
in terms of ‘state product per capita,’ ‘the unemployment rate,’ or,
‘construction permits’ or any other representative result.
The second concern is that no one metric is privileged and
therefore several instrumental metrics are examined. Similarly,
there is no conceptually distinct and a priori aggregation weighting
scheme. Thus, to the extent that the examined metrics convey
different and possible contradictory inferences there can be no
definitive way to conclude as to whether the election law was
successful – even if we examine only instrumental metrics.
Our results reflect those of Sullivan, Zagaja and those of Parnell.
Our efforts at determining the significance of the law are mixed:
some metrics do suggest statistically meaningful differences
whereas many others don’t. No results are evident in the 2008
cycle.

With token exceptions, all of the minute differences

observed, when they are in fact observed, occur by the 2010
election cycle.
Ironically, a law aiming to enhance electoral competition in the
state of Connecticut strengthened the position of the Democrats in
a robustly blue state: the results of several metrics appear to have
bestowed a slight edge to Democrats, at the expense of
Republicans. That the legislation may have benefited Democrats
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may be ironical but it is also unsurprising. Notwithstanding house
republican leader Larry Cafero’s observation that “the CEP made it
easier for his party to recruit candidates to run for office in
uncontested districts,”2 one would think that election law
proscriptions handicapping the ability of potential candidates to
raise money would most likely affect the generally more affluent
republicans.
Some caveats: despite the poor statistical showing of the election
law performance metrics in Connecticut it is distinctly possible that
the election law succeeds in “cleaning-up” the observed qualitative
electoral-related ills, as has been argued. On the other hand,
because of remaining porosity in the financing system the current
version of the law may not sufficiently curtail the continuing
practice of indirect flow of private funds to benefit favored
candidates. And given the curtailing presence of Citizens United it is
not clear whether there can be any further tightening (Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission 2010). Thus, we cannot
conclusively claim that the law does not work or that it works badly;
and we do not claim as much. Nevertheless, it does appear that
any benefits of clean election laws are more evident in the telling
than in reality.

2

Cited in (Zagaja 2009).
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The Backdrop
Corruption scandals culminating with the one surrounding then
Governor John Rowland left an unsightly blemish on Connecticut
state politics at the beginning of the new century. John Rowland
announced his resignation in June 2004. He was sentenced to
federal prison in 2005, charged with receiving improper gifts and
campaign contributions.

Convicted around this time were two

sitting-majors, Joseph Ganim of Bridgeport and Phil Giordano of
Waterbury as well as the State Treasurer Paul Sylvester. And with
the turmoil came calls for action, for reform, despite the fact that
reformers such the Connecticut Citizen Action Group and the
Connecticut chapter of Common Cause had spent a decade
attempting to move the issue onto the legislative agenda.
Rowland’s subsequent resignation from office finally hastened the
passage

of

legislation,

resulting

in

the

Act

Concerning

Comprehensive Reform for Statewide Constitutional and General
Assembly Offices (Nyhart 2006).
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Public Financing of Elections
A primary objective behind the boxing-in or outright removal of
private money in campaigns is to lessen influence peddling in
government outcomes: the ubiquitous “pay-to-play” influence of
interest groups in public policy. Ostensibly, in substituting state
monies in lieu of private monies elected officials will no longer be
beholden to the special interests represented by their contributors.
In turn, the implicit outcome of this cleansing would lead to
legislative outcomes that clearly reflect, or better reflect, the
interests of the majority.
Relatedly, the laws also attempt to reach the persistence of
incumbency.

Before there existed any public monies made

available by clean election laws, aspiring officeholders were
compelled to either raise money from citizens or interest groups or
self-finance their campaigns. In the face of a seemingly monolithic
incumbent few potential donors were willing to support a
challenger. Few candidates had the wherewithal to pay their own
way. The perception of invincibility associated with incumbency in
effect translated into a full-employment act for sitting legislators
(Mayer and Werner 2007).
Election law reformers felt that the seeming sense of entitlement
brandished by sitting legislators created by the lack of a credible
threat of removal rendered them ineffective and inattentive to the
concerns of their constituents.

Public monies and limits on

donations were considered an effective way to overcome the
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“barriers to entry.” Small donations pose a less serious threat
because the individuals who make them are in no position to
extract quid-pro-quo type of concessions from legislators.

Yet

despite the “breath-of-fresh-air” quality and the bona fide
innovations intended by the clean election laws several
inconsistencies can be noticed.
In Connecticut, the clean elections law adopted in 2005 was not a
voter initiative as they are in the few other states who have
embraced such reform. Rather, it was a legislative act. But if
individual state legislators knew that influence peddling was
endemic across their ranks – why not simply refuse to do the
special interest’s bidding? Why chose the more elaborate process
of assembling legislation to address this problem? Opting for
legislation – an approach which binds all – appears to be a solution
to a run-of-the-mill social dilemma problem (Elster 2007, Huberman
and Glance 1994). Every legislator was aware that collectively they
would all be better off if they refused special interest monies. And
getting elected – even in state legislature races – requires money.
Yet, to individually refuse to accept money from lobbyists was
impractical because the money would simply be funneled to a more
willing state assemblyman; after all, at some level assemblymen are
a fungible lot. By collectively agreeing to a common course of
action via legislation to avoid accepting special interest monies the
legislature found a solution to their “commons” problem.
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A second puzzling observation logically suggests itself. It’s not
clear that refusing private monies will lead to better social
outcomes. To our knowledge no meaningful evidence linking the
provision of the state funding of candidates to improved legislative
performance was provided. In fact, some would argue that the
impact on legislation has been nil. Voting by legislatures in the
2010 assembly was virtually indistinguishable from the previous
legislative voting patterns (Parnell 2010).

Nor was there any

evidence linking the proposed measure or to any other
performance metric, for that matter. In fact and to the contrary,
one can envision any number of scenarios in which the resulting
will of the majority, unencumbered by private monies, could have
serious negative economic repercussions. Thus, one has to wonder
why the focus of the clean elections legislation on what are merely
instrumental measures-rather than on measures that would
guarantee desired social outcomes – to the extent that it was
possible?
We conjecture that with implicit instrumental measures the
central concern of the public funding of elections law adopted by
Connecticut is its own reward. Indeed, the literature around the
“fairness heuristic” finds compelling evidence that most people
resort to perceived procedural fairness when information on the
trustworthiness of an authority is unavailable or corrupted (van den
Boos, Wilke and Lind 1998). Like Pompeia, the legislature must
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appear to be beyond reproach. The seeming impropriety of being
seen as beholden to private interests, especially after the uproar
resulting in the Governor Rowland’s impeachment, was diminishing
their moral stature in the community – and their re-election
chances.
We cannot answer; we can only surmise. But we can examine
the performance of several instrumental measures and thereby
provide a basis for tentative answers. This is our task in this paper.
To some extent, the ultimate impact of Connecticut’s efforts will
depend on of the evolving resolution of the recent controversial
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. In Citizens United the courts signaled its intention to
roll-back even long-standing limits on corporate campaign
contributions (The Hartford Courant 2011).

Empirical Methodology, Data Sources, Performance Metrics,
Limitations & Scope
We examine whether there is any statistically significant change
in the levels of various metrics between the periods before and
after the implementation of the legislation.

Specifically, we

scrutinize those variables originally examined by Sullivan:
(i) voter registration data
(ii) party registration data
(iii) election results
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We do so for the 2006 state assembly elections and compare
them to voter and party registration data and state assembly
election results in 2008 and in 2010, respectively (Sullivan 2009). In
principle, any observed statistically significant change in a given
metric is consistent with a hypothesis attributing causality to the
public elections law (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). Put simply:
any effects thereby attributable to the election laws could be
observable in the 2008 and 2010 election results.
We use resampling methods and draw multiple simulated
samples to calculate statistical significance (Good 2001). Since the
distribution of any statistic is attainable using resampling methods
it is possible to test any number of performance metrics.
In this instance resampling conveys three advantages over
parametric

and

non-parametric

techniques

provide

a

approaches.

non-parametric

Resampling

determination

of

a

performance metric’s distribution and a measure of effectiveness
that is not sensitive to deviations from the assumptions underlying
most parametric procedures. The simulated samples are drawn
from extant elections outcomes data instead of draws from a
theoretical data-generation process. The heteroskedasticity and
the small-numbers characteristics of the elections outcome data
are not consistent the desired error distributions and thereby
greatly limit the applicability of stochastic data models such as the
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traditional logistic or multiple linear regression models (Breiman
2001).
Potentially useful non-parametric tests such as the Wilcoxon
signed rank test and the sign-test are not constrained by the apriori data assumptions required by stochastic data models.
However, their flexibility comes at a loss of statistical power. It is
usually more difficult to reject the null hypothesis when nonparametrics are used, which in turn increases our chances of
incurring a type-II error (a failure to reject a null hypothesis that is
false). Thus, avoiding non-parametric methods would tend to
enhance the chances of a finding in favor of observable effects of
the elections law.
Last, we analyze statistical constructs in our analysis – e.g.
measures of diversity such as the gini coefficient, the herfindahl
index, and vote sums or totals, inter alia – for which the theoretical
statistical behavior is not known. In these instances the observed
sample statistic is compared with the null resampling distribution
derived from our resampling protocol discussed below.
We set forth our null hypothesis of no difference in the levels of
the examined statistics. Generally:
Ho: Φ2 - Φ1 = 0
Ha: Φ2 – Φ1 ≠ 0
Where: Φi represents the realization of a particular statistic in
the given election-cycle year `i’ and where year `1’ is always 2006.
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We generate via monte carlo simulation the permutation
distribution of the test statistics. We run 10,000 iterations using
Stata. We calculate the observed difference between the simulated
2008 and 2010 election (or 2006 and 2010, as the case might be)
assuming a null hypothesis of no difference in election results. We
compare the frequency of occurrence of this simulated statistic
with the observed difference between the levels of the statistic.
We reject the hypothesis and accept the alternative if the value of
the test statistic for the observations is an extreme value in the
permutation distribution of the statistic.

We use 95 percent

significance.

Data Sources and Data Treatment

The data used in examining the election law performance were
obtained from publicly available data for the years 2006, 2007, and
2008. Specifically, we culled data on the ‘vote for state
representatives’ for all ‘assembly districts’ reporting. The data is
published online by the Connecticut Secretary of State. (Secretary
of the State 2006) (Secretary of the State 2008, Secretary of the
State 2010).
The table below offers a comparative look at the metrics across
the three extant election cycles.
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Table 1
State Assembly Election Results
Sullivan Metrics
Metric

2006

2008

2010

Average Number of
Candidates per District
Race
Challengers
Incumbents

1.66
99
151

1.64
98
151

1.79
119
151

total number of
candidates
total number of races

250
151

249
151

270
151

27.8%

29.1%

20.5%

Percentage of
Uncontested Races
Voter Participation
Minor Party Affiliation

943,710 1,378,631 1,074,318
36.0%

37.3%

23.2%

For expositional purposes, we construct a second table. Table 2
contains the realized difference in the levels of each of the metrics
listed in Table 1. The figure in italics under each measure of
realized change is the p-value obtained from our statistical test.
The asterisks over each particular p-value indicate whether the
difference is statistically meaningful at a 95 percent level of
significance.
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Table 2
Realized Changes in the Sullivan Metrics:
Base Year 2006
Metric

2006-08

2006-10

Change in the Number of
Participating Voters
p-value

434,921
(0.0001)*

30,608
(0.0017)*

Change in the Number of
Challengers per District
Race
p-value

(2)
(0.8059)

20
(0.0146)*

Change in the
Percentage of
Uncontested Races
p-value
Minor Party Affiliation
p-value

1.3%
(0.5649)
1.3%
(0.6158)

-8.6%
(0.0146)*
-12.8%
(0.0135)*

We observe the following. The direction of change in the levels
between the 2006 and 20008 election cycles were to the contrary
of what one would expect. However, but for the number of
participating voters, no change in the levels of the Sullivan metrics
was statistically significant. And given the impressive ability to
energize voters by the 2008 Obama campaign it is not clear
whether the observed statistically significant increase in the
number of participating voters can be attributed in part – or at all –
to the election law.
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Additional Metrics
We examine several additional metrics to capture the relevance of
other dimensions of the reach of the elections law. Specifically, we
examine the following:

(i)

Change in the margin of victory for each particular
state house race, both in absolute terms and as a
percent of the total vote. We hypothesize that the
increased competitive vigor brought about by the
increased funding would reduce the margin of
victory as measured by both metrics.

(ii)

Electoral races are considered competitive if the
average outcome of races is less than or equal to
60%. We hypothesize that the electoral law should
increase competitiveness.

(iii)

Another measure of competitiveness of vigor is the
total number of votes cast by the opposition. We
hypothesize that the electoral law should
unequivocally result in an increase in the number of
votes cast by the opposition.

(iv)

Diversity is considered a desirable outcome. We
examine whether there has been an increase in
diversity with the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of
Concentration (HHI). We look at the share of party
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presence in the various races and also at the share of
total votes garnered by each party. The HHI is a
sample statistics and therefore its sampling variance
can be calculated. Formally, the index is calculated
as follows:

HHI = 10,000*
Where: Si is the relevant share of the either party presence or share
of votes. The higher the index the less diversity is present. The
maximum is HHI = 10,000, representing a one party outcome.
The data on the realized value of these other metrics are
presented in Table 3.
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Table 3
Metric

2006

2008

2010

Average Winning Margin of
Races (Levels)

3142

4352

2297

Winning Margin of Votes Cast (%
of total votes cast)

57.5%

54.8%

41.0%

Competitive Vote Margin (is the
average outcome less than or
equal to 60%?)

60.0%

55.0%

71.5%

Total Number of Votes Cast by
Opposition

233,864 361,352 367,999

Diversity Index of Opposition
(Herfindahl on Share of Party
Presence in the Various Races)

3588

3562

3995

Diversity Index of Opposition
(Herfindahl on Share of Votes
Garnered by Party)

5844

5402

5849

Results: Additional Metrics
Procedurally we use the same methodology described above.
Formally we test for any change at the 95 percent significance level
assuming a null hypothesis of no change.
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We again use

permutation methods to test our hypothesis and to generate our pvalues. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Metric

2006-08

2006-10

Change in the Average Winning
Margin of Voters
p-value

1,209
(0.561)

(845)
(0.487)

Difference in the Winning
Margin of Votes Cast (% of total
votes cast)
p-value

(0.03)
(0.657)

(0.17)
(0.0417)*

Difference in the Competitive
Vote Margin (is the average
outcome less than or equal to
60%)
p-value

(0.05)
(0.053)

0.12
(0.0017)*

Change in the Total Number of
Votes Cast by Opposition
127,488 134,135
p-value (0.031)* (0.0432)*
Change in the Diversity Index of
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share
of Party Presence in the Various
Races)
p-value
Change in the Diversity Index of
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share
of Votes Garnered by Party)
p-value

(27)
(0.671)

407
(0.450)

(442)
(0.759)

5
(0.562)

The overall results remain consistent with the overall results
obtained from testing the Sullivan metrics. First, few of the metrics
exhibit statistically significant change between the 2006 and 2008
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election cycle. Thus, the observed improvement in the winning
margin of votes cast as a percent of total votes cast is not
statistically significant.

The same findings emerge for the two

diversity indexes estimated. Second, there is discernible change in
the metrics between 2006 and 2008 that is contrary to what one
would expect – but the change is not statistically significant. For
example, there is an increase in the average winning margin (levels)
of votes between 2006 an 2008 (from 3142 votes to 4352) rather
than the anticipated decrease.
There are more significant changes in the comparison with the
2010 election cycle. But the results are contradictory. We find
positive improvements in the winning margin of votes cast but a
deterioration of competitive vote margin. Both are statistically
significant. Importantly, the diversity indexes show no statistically
discernible improvement at all, whether from the comparison to
the 2008 or the 2010 cycle. A somewhat troubling indicator is the
fact that party and opposition diversity appears to have
deteriorated by 2010 when compared to the party and opposition
layout present in the 2006 election, although the difference is not
statistically meaningful.

Interpretation of Results and Concluding Comments
Our results examining the impact on metrics aimed at appraising
the impact of the law are inconclusive: some metrics do suggest
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statistically meaningful differences whereas many others do not.
Hardly any statistically significant results are evident in the 2008
cycle.

With token exceptions, all of the minute differences

observed, when they are in fact observed, occur by the 2010
election cycle.
Ironically, a law aiming to enhance electoral competition
strengthened the position of the Democrats in a robustly blue state:
the results of several metrics appear to have bestowed a slight
edge to Democrats, at the expense of Republicans.

That the

legislation may have benefited Democrats may be ironical but it is
also unsurprising. To the extent that proscriptions handicap the
ability of potential candidates to raise money it is most likely to
affect the generally more affluent republicans.
Given the inconclusiveness in the information elicited by our
examination of the various metrics assembled it is difficult to
conclude that the public funding of elections in the State of
Connecticut is an unqualified success, or for that matter, a qualified
success.

First, no one metric takes precedence over another.

Second, any weighted combination of metrics must necessarily rely
on subjective weights.

Third, performance is essentially

multidimensional: superior performance against one objective
cannot easily be traded off against modest or inadequate
performance on another. Fourth, several of the proposed ‘success’
criteria may be specified inadequately. Fifth, and at any rate,
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`success’ in this instance refers to the performance of the chosen
metrics. Put differently, our examination scrutinized instruments,
not final outcomes.
It should be clear that the lack of conclusive discernible effects is
not evidence against the proffered benefits of the Connecticut
clean election law. Our inconclusive results may be an artifact of
the data, in other words, we could have an instance in which the
hypothesis is true but our metrics are poor representations of the
hypothesis, resulting in false negatives. The result may also be a
consequence of low statistical power, or the fact that the
“administration” of the law was faulty, or even that the existing law
left several gaping loopholes. In fact, one could realistically argue
that because of remaining porosity in the system the current law
may not sufficiently curtail the privately-directed flow of funds to
favored candidates. And given the presence of Citizens United it is
not clear whether there can be any further tightening. A critical
limitation of our study is the lack of covariates designed to hold
exogenous influences constant. It may very well be that there is a
vigorous effect ascribable to the election law but that is not
noticeable because it is eroded by broader confounding influences
– for which we don’t control. Last, given the historical importance
of local town and municipal elections in Connecticut a law aimed at
alleviating the ills of the state electoral system may miss the well
known point that all elections are really local, leading one to think
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that we are looking for lost keys where the light is and not where
we dropped them.
It is distinctly possible that election law has succeeded in
“cleaning-up” the observed intangible ills – the lingering sense of
corruption, the bothersome belief that only the more affluent are
listened to - as was argued. There is some support for that
perception. But more accurate or more specific tests will have to
wait a different occasion.
Thus, we cannot conclusively claim that the law does not work or
that it works badly. It appear that the one conclusion that we can
unambiguously draw is that the effusiveness and optimism of the
various commentators supporting clean election laws has not come
to be realized in the State of Connecticut.
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